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ness supplanted patriotism; men clamored for rights of their own while refusing them to others. The principles of individuality and order parted company, and Wordsworth — how could that moral and aging man do otherwise? — threw in his lot with the latter.

Having thus sadly discerned that individuality may be a principle as well of evil as of good, Wordsworth is less disposed than formerly to furnish each person with a stock of knowledge and then leave him to direct his life for himself. Happiness does not come in that way. To most of us instinctive action and a wise passiveness—always favorite agencies with Wordsworth—bring more of it than conscious knowledge. Legislation even, clumsy and external as it is, contributes little. The collective wisdom of the past, custom, institutions, and selected men as interpreters of these august matters, are our best guides. Too much education, stimulating as it does the desire of each to realize his own novel ideals, is less helpful than the priest and poet, who lead us to idealize the realities about us. An easy creed for old age! Is it that advancing years bring timidity or wisdom?

I have developed here my divergencies from Professor Harper rather than my agreements and large indebtedness. A book is good as it forces us to rethink its subject and to adjust our minds to its fresh material. Such a stimulating book is this, and I bring it my tribute of grateful criticism. In scope, seriousness, and minute knowledge, it takes rank with Masson's Milton, Elwin's Pope, and Dowden's Shelley, having besides its own special distinction. Its rich scholarship never clogs its literary ease. In every chapter one lingers over passages of penetrative insight and felicitous expression. Professor Harper agrees with Matthew Arnold in counting Wordsworth the most significant force in English poetry since Milton. Most readers of this book will accept that judgment.

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THE DRAMA OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE. A STUDY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND IDEALS. ANNIE LYMAN SEARS. The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xxvi, 495. \$3.00.

There are many approaches to the study of religion in our day. Some take the historical way, and study the rise and development of religion in a given race or in the race as a whole; others pursue the psychological way and investigate the nature of religious experience and the motives which explain its rise and the needs it fulfils. Still others are interested in its philosophical problems. The author of

this volume has not strictly followed either of these approaches. She takes now one way and again another. She is more interested in the problems of religion. She avails herself of the data presented by the students of the history and the psychology of religion, but her main interest is in the empirical nature of religion and the peculiar problems it presents for life and thought. She has been impressed with the paradoxes of religion, the strange oppositions and conflicting phases of religious experience, and she attempts a study of these for theoretical and practical purposes. She desires to determine the essential nature and spirit of religion, to correct current one-sided views, and to aid persons to live by and for a whole religion. She has a profound conviction of the greatness of religion and its imperative need in our day, if men would be true to their natures and would be saved to the things of the spirit.

Religion is grounded in the ideality of man's nature. His differentiation from the animal made possible and actual his religious experience. It lifted him above the sensuous; it made possible release from immediate necessity; it raised him above the spatial and temporal; it created an ideal world, and in this ideal world man's greatest creative activity is seen in his religion. Other needs and motives had their part in the development of religion, but the ideality of man's nature is the real fountain-head of religious experience. This makes religion an experience that is due fundamentally to man's rational nature. However much the emotional and the volitional factors enter into the life of religion, greater than either or both is the rational element.

If religion thus owes its rise to the ideality of man, the characteristic nature of religious experience reveals itself in oppositions, conflicts, even contradictions. The universal form of religious experience is the "triadic relation." There is the ideal of something good, divine, and eternal; there is also the keen sense of imperfection, incompleteness, and restlessness, and then there is a process or way of salvation, which, in redemptive religious experience, gives the sense of satisfaction, fruition, salvation. This is the fundamental form of religious experience; but there are certain other "oppositions" or "conflicts," which fall under this general scheme. These are the oppositions inherent in the very forms or types of religious experience itself: such as the mystical as opposed to the ethical, and the individual as opposed to the social. Then too there is another series of oppositions as to the source of the religious life, such as grace as opposed to merit, or necessity as opposed to freedom, or the inner as opposed to the outer. Once more, with reference to the form of

the spiritual life there is another series of oppositions, such as temporal and eternal, dynamic and static, and the many and the one.

These oppositions appear at times to be irreconcilable; they are taken by some to be contradictory; they are, however, not so in their true nature. They are only so, when the *one series* of elements is made the sole factor. If all are seen as parts of a whole, factors in a living teleological process, then each is seen to require the other for its fulfilment. They are different values in a perfect whole of experience.

It is in the discussion of these series of oppositions that the book has its original character and derives its special value. The author pursues these oppositions as they manifest themselves in religious experience in all ages and in many lands, and shows their analogue in the other experiences of life, and thus makes the religious experience a part of the total experience of human life. Likewise she shows how philosophy, ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, has been confronted with this oppositional character of our experience. In the philosophical portion of the discussion the contemporary tendencies have full recognition, though the author holds quite firmly and whole-heartedly to idealism, especially in its Roycean form; for all these oppositions are finally reconciled in unique selves, each fulfilling his meaning, each living his life in an ideal community and in relation with the Infinite and Eternal Self, the great Unifier of all selves.

It is this recognition of the ultimate spiritual reality that makes her dissatisfied with the many modern attempts to give the world a "religion without God," and in nothing are her critical powers and religious earnestness seen to better advantage. The same may also be said of her criticism of our over-practical emphasis in religion. The religion of efficiency is far from being the religion of the spirit.

This ideality of religion on the one hand and these manifold oppositions on the other, she finds abundantly evidenced in the literature of life and religion. Here is another special feature of her book. The material here gathered is richer in content, wider in range, and more varied in character than has yet been gathered by any other writer. She is more critical in her selection than James or Mrs. Burr, and more catholic in her range than Stratton. All workers in this field of study will greatly benefit from her wide reading. A perusal of this literature will justify her emphasis on the spiritual, ethical, individual, and social nature of religion, and save one from current crude notions of religion and counterfeit substitutes for the real thing.

Good as the book is, it cannot pass without criticism. And the first criticism concerns her use of the material. Not a little of the material is used two and three times, and now and again on opposite pages, as in quotations from Marcus Aurelius and Thomas Hardy and St. Augustine; material which belongs in one section is misplaced, as in case of some prayers under class III; in general it may be said that she gets lost in her materials, as in her long discussion on Romanticism, and the one and the many, and the section on the development of the religion of Israel and of primitive religion; also in her discussion of grace, which runs off into exegetical and doctrinal questions. This makes for weariness of mind. She has a suspicion of this herself, judging from the number of times she has to "return" to her subject.

Then again with reference to her scheme, her formula. It is not a little surprising that in a time when philosophical systems are at a discount, and theological plans of salvation are thrown upon the scrap-heap, we should have presented to us formulas within formulas of the process of salvation. Thus we have a "triadic" form of religious experience, and then a "series of oppositions," and then again formal logic lends its "serial and cyclic processes," and finally the perfect form is found in "rhythm," which is at once psychophysical, æsthetic, and cosmic. It is very well, if we can get a formula large enough and flexible enough for all our experience and material, but this scheme fails to do this, for it often requires the compression, transposition, repetition of the same material. This makes for confusion in the mind of the reader as well as in the mind of the author. Her own suspicion is expressed more than once that life is richer than formula.

Once more, her thought with reference to ultimate reality of the object experienced in religion is not quite clear. It wavers, it oscillates between the subjective and objective, the ideal and the real. On one page, she appears to believe in the ultimate reality of the object of religion, even to its personal nature and its highest interpretation in the terms of love, and in certain footnotes she is quite explicit on this matter. And yet in other places, the subjective meaning is intended, and great objective spiritual concepts like grace and prayer and salvation are so humanized in their meaning and reference that the divine reference is either minimized or ignored. If there were more clearness and steadiness of thought on these fundamental matters, the book would gain much in value. Perhaps the original difficulty comes from the fact that the author does not see that religion takes its rise, not from man's conceiving an ideal,

but from man's conviction that he is in touch and connection with ultimate spiritual reality. It is from such an experience that religion takes its rise and religious ideals are created. In the drama of the spiritual life the Divine Reality plays the leading rôle.

To careless reading or transcription such errors as these are due: the quotation from St. Paul on page 19, where "spirit of God," should be "spirit of Christ"; the verse, "If ye love not your brethren," etc., is quoted on page 347 as if it were spoken by Jesus. Ereigniss is misspelled on page 222. In the quotation from Shelly, "pane" takes place of "dome"; Professor Starbuck's book on "The Psychology of Religion" is twice given a wrong title; the Hindu prayer is not found on page 261, as stated on page 298, nor Augustine's prayer, as stated on page 318; there are also several sentences where the meaning is not in accord with the context, and the word "æsthetic" is sometimes used in the ordinary sense and at other times as meaning mystical.

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The Freudian Wish, and its Place in Ethics. Edwin B. Holt. Henry Holt & Co. 1915. Pp. 208. \$1.25.

The author of this interesting volume is well known as an able advocate of the empirical, "realistic," objective method of studying the world and life, and as a consistent opponent of the subjective, introspective, a priori method; which he thinks open to the serious criticism of encouraging vague and misleading speculation and to have contributed little of real value for ethics or for human conduct. There will be many persons who, like the reviewer, will fail to recognize the stamp of permanence and all-sufficiency, of freedom from bias or from "wish," in the mode of looking at the truth advocated by Dr. Holt, any more than in that which he repudiates, and yet will find in this stimulating book, as in The Concept of Consciousness by the same author, a number of theses that should command admiration and attention. That the author's attitude is frankly materialistic will be accepted as an asset of value by some readers. and must be forgotten for the moment by the rest, if they would learn the lessons that the essay has to teach.

As in his former book Dr. Holt set himself the task of describing the emergence of consciousness among the progressive integrations of the unfolding series of "natural" phenomena, and of emphasizing, let us say, the more obviously objective aspect of the man—nature